

CD-ROM

TIME

THE FIRST DRAFT OF HISTORY

DESERT STORM

The War in the Persian Gulf



Correspondents' reports, eyewitness accounts, photos, audio recordings, maps, charts, research and key documents gathered by the editorial staff of TIME.



A Shield in the Sand

Two leaders stared across the brink. As each refused to blink, the world moved slowly toward January 15, 1991, and war.

It was summer, 1990, and around the world there seemed to be more hope, less confrontation, than anytime in the memory of Americans born since World War II. Months before, the Iron Curtain had crumbled. Political and economic reforms were sweeping across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Freedom, opportunity and optimism were the verbal banners of the future. In the United States, politicians spoke of the Peace Dividend: the hope for a new prosperity, a wholesale reordering of government spending away from defense and toward urgent domestic needs. Who would have guessed, in the lazy weeks of late July and early August, that a tiny corner of the Middle East would suddenly seize the world's

attention, reversing the benign trend of events, turning minds once more toward war and hate, power blocs and fear of the future?

As 100,000 Iraqi troops swarmed across Kuwait during the early hours of August 2, the world watched wide-eyed at what it took for a giant bluff by Saddam Hussein. But it was not. And it sparked an unprecedented worldwide reaction that would, over the next 167 days, transform global alignments and write a new chapter in history. As events marched to their inevitable climax, they left milestones: sanctions, threats and dozens of futile attempts at negotiation.

A Gathering Storm

In retrospect, all the elements were there: Hussein had the motive, the opportunity and certainly the capability. A few weeks earlier, he had charged Kuwait with conspiring to keep oil prices low and accused it of siphoning oil from the Rumaila oil fields which straddle the Iraq-Kuwait border. By the end of July, two Iraqi armored divisions were gathered there. Hussein was quick to offer assurances that their presence was intended only to intimidate Kuwait during negotiations over oil production and debt repayment. Meanwhile, the State Department reassured

Hussein that the United States would not take sides in what was considered a minor border dispute. The Saudi-mediated talks between Iraq and Kuwait collapsed on August 1 and the now infamous invasion followed the next morning.

Response was immediate. The U.S. froze Iraqi assets and imposed a trade embargo on Iraq. The E.C. and Japan followed suit. Frozen assets totalled some \$100 billion worldwide. Initiating Operation Desert Shield, the President denounced Iraq's act of "naked aggression" against Kuwait and mobilized American troops to Saudi Arabia. The United Nations Security Council voted overwhelmingly to condemn the invasion, demanded Iraq's unconditional withdrawal and within days passed a resolution imposing tough economic sanctions aimed at forcing Iraq to disgorge Kuwait.

Almost immediately, the Iraqi leader proved that he was not only audacious but also ruthless and unpredictable. Instead of following through on his promise to withdraw after five days, Hussein raised 100,000 "volunteers" to serve in Kuwait and briefly appointed a puppet government for the tiny state. Ominously, he moved his troops within five miles of the Saudi border. At the same

time, he quickly sealed the borders of both countries, trapping tens of thousands of foreigners including 3,500 Americans and effectively holding them hostage.

Brutal Occupation

Saddled with a \$70 billion debt which fueled a long-held resentment toward Kuwait's great wealth, Saddam demanded reparation. He asked for no less than \$2.4 billion in compensation for oil he claimed Kuwait had withdrawn illegally from fields along the border and he insisted that Kuwait forgive the \$10 to \$20 billion in loans it extended to Iraq during its war with Iran. He then proceeded to sever the country from its possessions and resources, including \$1 billion in gold from the Kuwaiti treasury, and let his soldiers loose to terrorize the population. World reaction turned to horror as the brutality of the occupation unfolded. Kuwaitis and other refugees, escaping to Saudi Arabia by crossing the scorching desert, told graphic tales of wholesale looting, rape and murder. In just five months, Iraqi troops caused an estimated \$60 billion in damage, killing hundreds of Kuwaitis and imprisoning thousands.

Saddam's bluff became a challenge not just for control of oil but also for supremacy

in the Middle East. In late August, Iraq, pursuing a long-standing claim, declared Kuwait to be its 19th province. With the country firmly annexed, Iraq controlled one-fifth of the world's proven oil reserves. Saddam commanded a fighting force toughened by the war with Iran and backed by a massive stockpile of weapons and equipment. Indeed, his military and economic dominance in the region was momentarily secure. He seemed confident that in the ensuing military standoff he could pursue his ambition to become the beacon of Arab nationalism. Saddam's strategy was to portray himself as the defender of the poor Arab masses against the rich imperialist West, then wait as long as necessary until the coalition crumbled and sanctions were no longer enforced. He would, if all went according to plan, emerge a hero.

By mid-August, Saddam offered a cleverly crafted deal. He would withdraw from Kuwait as part of a settlement of "all issues of occupation," including Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, and a Syrian pullout from Lebanon. By bringing Israel into the conflict Saddam hoped to gather Arab support soundly behind him. Bush's response was emphatic. There was to be "no linkage" of issues.

A Line in the Sand

Each believed the other side would blink. For several years Saddam had enjoyed a position of unchallenged power in the region, quietly supported by the U.S., which saw him as a useful countervailing force to Iran. He evidently saw no reason for that policy to change because he invaded one small emirate. But Saddam miscalculated on several fronts. After the invasion, oil prices on the spot and futures markets skyrocketed. The seriousness of the oil issue made the United States stand firm in protecting its "vital interests." Worried that the Iraqis might continue on and invade Saudi Arabia, Bush drew a "line in the sand." He then rallied a disparate group of post-cold war nations to contain Iraqi expansionism. Surprisingly, even the Arab League condemned the invasion and several of its members committed money and troops. Only a handful of countries — including Jordan, whose King Hussein seemed paralyzed by the dual pressures from his neighbor Saddam Hussein and the powerful Palestinian element among his subjects — proclaimed support for Iraq. The White House believed that Saddam, faced with world condemnation, would finally back down. For Iraq, however, this scenario would involve

not only public humiliation and loss of its newfound wealth, but ultimately loss of regional dominance. Saddam would not give up without a fight.

Through August, the conflict quickly accelerated with war-like rhetoric launched by both sides. Bush authorized the call-up of 40,000 reserves, the first since Vietnam. In another first, the U.N. Security Council approved a resolution authorizing military action to enforce trade sanctions against Iraq. Disdained as a powerless and preachy international debating society for more than a decade, the U.N. came back with vengeance as a global political player.

A Hostage Bazaar

The uncertainty of the future of the thousands of foreigners who were kept hostage and held as human targets in Iraq and Kuwait brought home the severity of the situation. Many were moved to industrial and military sites to act as shields against attack. In one grossly transparent attempt at public relations, Saddam held a televised meeting with several "guests of the Iraqi people," and explained that they were detained in Iraq to prevent war from breaking out. Then, in a sudden gesture, he startled observers by per-

mitting foreign women and children to leave both countries. Meanwhile Baghdad found itself inundated by foreign leaders and celebrities such as Jesse Jackson and Muhammad Ali, all seeking the release of hostages and turning the city into what the State Department called a "hostage bazaar."

Foreign embassies in Kuwait defied Hussein's orders to shut down. The test of wills was briefly broken when Iraqi soldiers forcibly entered the French, Canadian, Australian and Belgian embassies, holding five consuls several hours and taking four French hostages. Nevertheless, British and American diplomats held out — with limited food, water and no electricity — for another three months.

The Cost of War

Bush continued to play down the gravity of events by steadfastly remaining at his summer home in Kennebunkport, Me. When he finally emerged in early September he was confronted with a number of questions which came to be repeated with increasing frequency as the standoff continued. What was the purpose of the military presence in the Gulf? How could the Administration justify the enormous cost (\$2.5 billion in August and

September alone) at a time when the country was facing a serious financial crisis? Would we actually go to war? But Bush gracefully side-stepped these questions with responses couched in moral terms, calling Saddam an enemy "worse than Hitler" and declaring that nothing less than America's "way of life" was at stake. Through the fall, the President proved himself more adept at securing international cooperation than quelling criticism at home. He continued to do what he did best, lobbying members of the international coalition for military and economic support.

In an historical footnote, the confrontation brought together old adversaries. On September 9, George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev met in Helsinki and issued a declaration condemning the invasion and committing themselves to further action should sanctions fail. The next day, Iran and Iraq resumed diplomatic ties broken by their eight-year war.

A Sense of Urgency

The steady pace continued for the next month while the path to peaceful resolution became more cluttered with obstacles. Neither the U.S. nor Iraq was reversing course. Anxiety grew as Iraq threatened a first strike

against Israel and Saudi Arabia, increasing fears over Iraq's nuclear capability and its use of chemical weapons in an armed conflict.

By November, Washington, while trying to squeeze Saddam with economic sanctions, prepared for an offensive military confrontation. President Bush ordered a virtual doubling in U.S. forces, bringing the total number of Americans deployed to 430,000. Spending Thanksgiving with the troops, Bush spoke of a "sense of urgency" in the Gulf conflict, while on Capitol Hill hearings continued on the effectiveness of sanctions against Iraq.

Reflecting a deeply divided nation which was ambivalent about a war and afraid to repeat the mistakes of Vietnam, public opinion shifted frequently.

When Saddam Hussein finally released the hostages trapped in Iraq and Kuwait for over four months, some of the outrage that originally fueled domestic opinion melted away.

Perhaps the confusion was more a response to the President's shifting rhetoric. With bewildering speed, Bush alternated stands between war and peace saying at once that the "sand is running through the glass" for Iraq and almost in the same breath, "we're prepared to give sanctions time to work."

Moral Authority

Options narrowed and the President grew more resolute. On Nov. 29, the U.N. Security Council, urged by the U.S., set a January 15 deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and authorized the use of force against Iraq if it refused. Armed with the world's moral authority, Bush proposed a pre-deadline meeting between the U.S. and Iraq.

At home, a showdown developed on Capitol Hill. Returning to Washington after a two-month recess for the November elections, the 102nd Congress convened on Jan. 3 and was thrown immediately back into the fray. With the words "Now is the time and here is the place to debate," freshman Senator Tom Harkin, a Democrat from Iowa, opened Congressional debate on who would provide the authorization for war. On one hand, the President, who had for months failed to seek approval for his gulf policies, asserted his role as Commander in Chief and made it clear that he considered military action was a subject for his decision alone. But, invoking Article I of the Constitution, Congress stated that it possessed the sole authority to declare war.

Less than a week before the deadline, tension was rising steadily. A crucial meeting

between Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz on January 9 in Geneva lasted for a grinding six hours and 27 minutes of tough talk before it broke up, each side accusing the other of intransigence. Aziz declared that the tone of the letter from President Bush to Saddam Hussein was worded more as a letter of ultimatum than compromise and he refused to deliver it. Baker said that Iraq must unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait while Aziz insisted that the conflict had to be solved in conjunction with other problems in the Middle East.

A Matter of Conscience

The failure of the Geneva Summit obliterated any hope for a diplomatic solution. Congress was forced finally to decide whether to line up behind the President and grant the use of military force, or to withhold approval, and vote instead to give sanctions more time to work. While Bush lobbied for votes, House Speaker Tom Foley reminded fellow Congressmen that their vote was a "matter of conscience." In a solemn vote, the House, dividing 250 to 183, and the Senate, 52 to 47, adopted resolutions that authorized the President to use military force against Iraq after January 15.

A desperate last ditch effort by U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar two days before the deadline also failed to convince Iraq to withdraw. Perez de Cuellar left Baghdad, dejected, declaring "Only God knows" if there would be a war. With that, the waiting was over, the long prelude to war was ended. January 15 came, and the world held its breath. ■

THE FIRST DRAFT OF HISTORY

In about the year 424 B.C., the people of Athens exiled a minor general for botching a battle against their arch-enemy, Sparta. Out of work and banished from his homeland, Thucydides, probably in his late 20s, spent the next two decades roaming the eastern Mediterranean, collecting and writing down first-hand reports and his own observations of the ongoing Peloponnesian War as it raged for 27 years across his known world.

In doing so, he invented war reporting, a kind of story telling that, until now, has changed little in the last 2,500 years. Its goals

have remained as Thucydides set them out:

"I have made it a principle not to write down the first story that came my way, and not even to be guided by my own general impressions; either I was present myself at the events which I described or else I heard them from eye-witnesses whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible. Not that even so the truth was easy to discover."

A Higher Loyalty

While under continuous threat to their lives, war reporters — still usually in their mid-20s to mid-30s — have intellectual struggles every bit as harrowing. They constantly balance a desire for personal safety and loyalty to their people with loyalty to that higher professional and personal calling: discovering the truth.

The product of that endeavor, war reporting, takes a dramatic step into the future with this publishing of TIME's "Desert Storm — The First Draft of History."

Now, for the first time, the audience becomes witness to the reporters' struggles as well as the outcome. With the immediacy of CD-ROM publishing, the audience now can review the gritty dispatches, sounds and im-

ages of war that TIME reporters and editors sift through each week. Drawing on the experience of TIME's staff and the power of multimedia, citizens can find for themselves the truth of the Persian Gulf War, an event that has captured the attention of the world.

The recent merger of TIME Inc. and Warner Communications Inc. made this journalistic leap forward a possibility.

Planning the Coverage

In a meeting on the evening of Jan. 16, 1991, just hours after United Nations forces dropped the first bombs on Baghdad, TIME magazine executive editor Dick Duncan and his colleagues took a hard look at what lay ahead.

With war reporters and news photographers stationed throughout the Middle East and around the globe, hundreds of dispatches and thousands of photographs and audio tapes would soon be pouring into TIME headquarters. TIME editors and writers were poised to sift through this storm of first-hand reports, prepared to develop the concise review of the coming weeks' events that the world would soon read in TIME.

A call went out from Duncan to his colleague Stan Cornyn, president of Warner New

Media, a California-based TIME WARNER division. Cornyn presides over a company of electronic publishing pioneers. Not only should the magazine's war coverage be electronically published, Cornyn suggested, but also the thousands of data sources which are TIME's building blocks. Such a CD-ROM product, as Cornyn envisioned it, was simple, at least in conception.

The editors of TIME in New York would forward to Warner New Media every report, every audio-taped interview and every photograph that contributed to the telling of every story in TIME, for every issue published during the Persian Gulf war.

Then the editors, graphics designers and computer programmers of Warner New Media in Burbank would, together with their partners at TIME, develop an elegant means to navigate through these thousands of items on computers with CD-ROM disc drives.

One Last Thing...

And, oh yes, one other thing. It should be complete and on store shelves as soon as the war is over.

That publishing speed has until now been unheard of in the CD-ROM world. Containing the information of 500 floppy disks, a

CD-ROM typically takes six months or more to compile, edit and index. TIME and Warner New Media decided to go for it: from newsdesk to NewsDisc to retail shelf in a matter of days.

At that moment, a new kind of journalism was born.

With the speed of light, reports, images and audio interviews of Operation Desert Storm were whisked around the globe to the offices of TIME, through Warner New Media and now into your home computer.

Subsequent TIME NewsDiscs will play both on computers and also on a new generation of CD-ROM "players" coming to market in 1991. These new players will display CD-ROM images on home TV sets and play sound through home stereo systems. As CD-ROM technology moves toward the mass market, instant publishing could well become the journalism medium of the future.

"Eventually, electronic journalism should find itself on roadside newsstands," says Cornyn. "Following that, it might come to home recorders via optic fiber cables. But right now, we're doing enough for one week. Just taking two steps at a time." ■

SET UP

Desert Storm is designed to run on a Macintosh® Plus or newer machine with at least 1 megabyte of RAM, System 6.0.5 or later and an Apple®-compatible SCSI CD-ROM drive. Color machines require 2 megabytes of RAM. Displays in black and white on Macintosh LC with 12-inch color monitor.

For further information, open the README.MAC;1 text file on the "Desert Storm" CD-ROM. Files on this CD-ROM are stored in ISO 9660 format, a universal computer storage standard. ISO file names contain underline characters, punctuation and letters in all caps.

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